RT rechtfertigt OIR-Luftschlag auf syrische Truppen – update

Update: Heute vormittag gab es eine Verurteilung vom stellvertretenden russ. Außenminister Gatilov. Ihre Wortwahl ist scharf, die Berufungsinstanz ist es nicht:

“Any military actions leading to the aggravation of the situation in Syria definitely affect the political process. Especially if such actions are committed against the Syrian armed forces… This is totally unacceptable; it is a violation of Syrian sovereignty. Of course, it does not help the political process”

RT bleibt dabei, der angegriffene Konvoi habe nicht der SAA angehört, es seien „pro-government forces“, bzw. in der Sprachregelung der OIR eine „militia group fighting alongside Syrian government forces“ gewesen. RT besteht weiterhin auf der Darstellung, die Angegriffenen „könnten“ eine vereinbarte Deeskalationszone verletzt haben. Gatilov geht auf diesen Punkt nicht ein.
Aktuelle Meldungen von AMN sprechen dafür, daß keine regulären syrischen Truppen an den Kämpfen mit den US-Proxies beteiligt sind. Die Bilder der neu zusammengestellten Konvois, welche die angegriffene Einheit angeblich entsetzen sollen, zeigen ausschließlich die milizentypischen, maschinenkanonenbewehrten Toyotas, keine Armeefahrzeuge. Auch SANA ist stumm – die jüngste Meldung (10:50 in Hannover) betrifft ein Treffen der Regierungsdelegation mit Staffan de Mistura in Genf. Es ist, anders, als Gatilov es hinstellt, offenbar nicht „beschädigt“ worden. Seine Worte sind wohl für die Galerie.
AMN nennt in der o.zit Meldung die „Syrian Social Nationalist Party“ als Beteiligte des Vorstoßes in Ost-Homs und Suweida. Ich lehne mich mal mit dem Urteil aus dem Fenster, wer immer sich mit diesen Typen zusammen tut, will den Totalen Krieg.
Update Ende.

RT gestern:

The de-escalation or safe zones agreement in Syria came into effect earlier this month … The zones were established in several Syrian provinces, including in Homs, as agreed by the guarantor states – Russia, Iran and Turkey …

schreibt RT zu den Twittermeldungen des Oberkommandos OIR

Die zweite beruft sich auf eine Vereinbarung mit dem russischen War Room.
Der „Witz“ ist allerdings, das kleine Schlachtfest fand an einem Ort 150 km Luftlinie von Al Tanf entfernt statt, wie Al Masdar News (AMN) unter Berufung auf Damaskus mitteilte. RT zitiert die Angaben AMNs zu Umständen und Opfern, schweigt aber zum Ort.
Die Rasi’i Well, wo die Schlächterei stattgefunden haben soll, liegt an oder auf der Provinzgrenze zwischen Homs und Suweida. Die plausibelste Erklärung des Vorgangs ist, daß Moskau den östlichen Teil der Provinz Homs den amerikanischen Proxies zugesprochen und Damaskus verboten hat, die Belagerung der Provinz Suweida aufzuheben, die westlich an „Rebellengebiete“ der „Deeskalationszone“ Daraa grenzt, während im Norden die umkämpften Gebiete der Ghouta-Ebene liegen. So dürfte sich die kleine Kampftruppe (angeblich fünf T-62) verbotswidrig aufgemacht haben, im Osten der Provinz die Verbindung mit den SAA-Truppen zu suchen, welche die Ghouta-Ebene von Qaryataynen aus südlich zu umfassen suchen.

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11 Antworten zu RT rechtfertigt OIR-Luftschlag auf syrische Truppen – update

  1. Klaus-Peter schreibt:

    SANA entstummte mittlerweile:
    http://sana.sy/en/?p=106462

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    • tgarner9 schreibt:

      Mit einer ungenannten „militärischen Quelle“.

      The source asserted that the army will continue performing its duty of fighting ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and defending its entire territory, and will not be discouraged from doing this “sacred” duty by these attempts of the so-called international coalition.

      Danke.

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  2. tgarner9 schreibt:

    RT hat jetzt ein paar „harsche Worte“ von Peter Ford („mission creep“) und einem Professor aus Beirut zum Vorfall angeschleppt, mit denen ihr eure Zeit verschwenden würdet – ich erwähne sie der Fairness halber.

    Auch Jaafari hat sich unterdessen beschwert.
    Der TASS-Artikel ist ein Musterbeispiel für die etwas (ein klein wenig) subtilere Moskauer Propaganda. Erst heißt es da:

    As the US-led coalition headquarters reported, the aircraft struck pro-Syrian government forces operating within the established de-escalation zone northwest of al-Tanf.

    Im „Nordwesten“ statt weit abseits im Südwesten von Al Tanf, wo der Angriff nach dem Zeugnis eines halben Dutzend Berichterstatter statt fand. Abgesehen davon, daß ein Druck- Übersetzungsfehler immer möglich ist, muß man von einer Lüge ausgehen. Zugleich wird die „established de-escalation zone“ im Zitat zum strittigen Punkt stilisiert, indem gleich anschließend Jaafari wie folgt zitiert wird:

    Mechanisms on implementing the agreement on de-escalation zones in Syria have not yet been established, according to Jaafari.

    Das wird er gesagt haben, aber ganz bestimmt nicht im Zusammenhang mit dem Angriff, den er eine „Aggression“ genannt hat, nicht einen „Irrtum“ oder „Übergriff“.

    Inzwischen hat AMN die Mitteilung und ein Video einer PMU-Einheit veröffentlicht, die gestern im Bereich des Al Qaim – Grenzübergangs, also auf der Höhe von Deir Ezzor, aus der Luft angegriffen worden sein soll. Wir müssen in Betracht ziehen, daß es sich um eine Erfindung handelt, aber andererseits paßt der Vorgang bestens zu der offenkundigen Tatsache, daß die Trump-Administration ihre Gegner zumindest mit Blick auf den Irak übertölpelt hat. Es wäre ja nicht das erste Mal, daß amerikanische Flieger zusammen mit europäischen Verbündeten militärisch gegen die Verhandlungen und Vereinbarungen des Weißen Hauses vorgegangen sind (der „irrtümliche“ Angriff auf Verteidiger Deir Ezzors, der eine Waffenruhe in Aleppo beendete).

    Und schließlich passt es auch zu dieser Meldung. Michael Oren, der schon 2012 „Klartext“ zu Israels Ambitionen im Syrienkrieg geredet hat und jetzt im Kabinett Netanyahus sitzt, verlangt im Namen seines Chefs Sanktionen gegen den Iran im selben, geschäftsunterbindenden Umfang, wie vor dem „Nukleardeal“. Das ist angesichts des europäischen Widerstandes, dem sich vor einigen Wochen auch die NATO-Führung angeschlossen hat, eine illusorische Forderung. Sie steht für eine militärische Erpressung, deren Ziel die „israelische Sicherheitszone“ ist, die der Artikel als nachrangige Forderung Netanyahus behandelt.

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  3. tgarner9 schreibt:

    Dunford auf der heutigen Pressekonferenz mit Mattis und McGurk (sinngemäß): Die Russen wissen jetzt, was Sache ist, und nach meinen nächtlichen Gesprächen mit ihren Vertretern, bin ich ziemlich sicher, daß ein Vorfall wie dieser, da wir trotz deutlicher Warnung zur Selbstverteidigung schreiten müssen, nicht wieder vorkommen wird.

    Im selben Sinne machte er klar, daß die US-Proxies auf Deir Ezzor marschieren würden und er erwarte, daß die syrische Armee sich entweder auf russische Anweisung von dort zurück ziehe, oder demobilisiere.

    (Nur für den Fall, daß es kein Transkript dieses ansonsten öden Propagandatermin geben wird)

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  4. Klaus-Peter schreibt:

    Ich habe nur den RT Artikel gelesen, interpretiere folgendes jedoch eher als Signal an Teheran als nach Moskau – ordnet eure Proxies endlich den Russen unter und gut is!

    “It was necessitated by offensive movement, of what we believe were Iranian-directed forces,” Mattis said, that acted “against the advice of the Russians.”

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    • tgarner9 schreibt:

      Hi, Klaus Peter, ich ziehe die interessanten Abschnitte aus dem Transcript aus.

      Q: As — you said we will not stop after Raqqa. You moved down the Euphrates River Valley. You have Dawr az Zawr there with Syrian troops located there. And I understand some small numbers are still moving that way.
      And then, to the west, you have al-Tanf which you — airstrikes hit some Shia militias heading towards al-Tanf. (…) So, given those two areas, are you worried about al-Tanf continuing to be a — you know, a place where the militias and the Russians will continue to strike, still under threat? And also, with Dawr az Zawr, what do you — what do you do as you head down the Euphrates River Valley? Do you just bypass them? Do you coordinate with the Russians? You say here, you will never work with the Assad regime. How do you deal with those troops sitting there — Syrian troops?

      GEN. DUNFORD: Hey, Tom. I’ll — I’ll start with it.

      And — and — and first, I think as you know, we’re — we’re precluded by law from coordinating with the Russians. Having said that, we have, for many months now, worked very hard to deconflict their operations. And a primary purpose is to ensure the safety of our airmen, our personnel on the ground, and allow us to continue to campaign.

      I’m — I’m — I’m confident that we’ve made progress in that regard over the last couple months. Spoke to my … Russian counterpart as recently as last night. We — we speak routinely when we need to, to work through the deconfliction.

      In addition to the direct communication that I have, we’ve opened up a three-star level channel where RJ5 here in the joint staff routinely corresponds — communicates with his counterpart in Moscow. And then we have a pretty robust operational link on the ground from our combined air operations center and counter to the — to the Russians on the ground.

      And we are looking for the Russians to — to work with the regime, to deconflict our operations. I think what you’re highlighting is absolutely a fair point, which is the ground is becoming increasingly complex and constrained. But to date, we have — we have been able to deconflict operations.

      We had a proposal that we’re working on with the Russians right now. I won’t share the details. But — but my sense is that the Russians are as enthusiastic as we are to deconflict operations and ensure that we can continue to take the campaign to ISIS and ensure the safety of our personnel.

      Q: Will that proposal deal with the Syrian sitting there in Dawr az Zawr?

      GEN. DUNFORD: It — it will. It will. And we have talked about that as a specific area that requires deconfliction. So, we have done that.

      Q: And lastly, you talk about deconfliction. Well, it didn’t work yesterday or the day before when you called the Russians and said get those militias to stop and they did not. You had to strike them.

      GEN. DUNFORD: That’s exactly right. And just to be clear, that was a force protection strike. Our commanders on the ground felt like they were threatened at that point. And their rules of engagement allow them to do that.

      We’ve gone back and — and — and had a conversation at every level now to ensure that those kinds of incidents don’t take place again. Last night, I — I made a commitment that they wouldn’t happen again if our forces weren’t threatened. And everybody understands what the rules are. So, that’s what’s going to prevent it in the future.

      Q (from later on): Yeah, I want to go back to the Tanf operation that took place yesterday. Could you confirm that — that the targeted Shia militias were Iranians or Hezbollah?

      And do you see any interest — any vital interest — interest to the U.S. and the coalition to control the whole Syrian-Iraqi border?

      SEC. MATTIS: Yeah, let me take a stab at this. At al-Tanf is what you’re referring to, the force that moved near al-Tanf. Is that what you’re referring to?

      That was, again, as the chairman pointed out, self-defense of our forces. It was necessitated, sir, by offensive movement with offensive capability of what we believe were Iranian-directed — I don’t know there were Iranians on the ground, but by Iranian-directed forced inside an established and agreed-upon deconfliction zone.

      We believe they moved into that zone against the advice of the Russians. Or — or — you know, apparently against the advice of the Russians. I can’t confirm that either, but it looks like the Russians tried to dissuade them.

      Q: I’d like to ask the — the two veterans of the Obama administration. If the decision at the end of the Obama administration to hold off on arming the Turks and let the Trump administration make that decision, did that have any effect or delaying the assault on Raqqa?

      GEN. DUNFORD: Yeah, David, I — I can — I can answer that question directly. It did not.

      One of the — one of the preconditions for seizing Raqqa was the isolation of Raqqa, which included — just recently completed a very difficult fight in an area called Tabqa. And I think you’re familiar with that, where the Syrian Democratic Forces actually had 100 killed in that battle alone.

      So, we are just at about the point where the seizure of Raqqa would’ve taken place in a normal course of events. So, it has not delayed the seizure of Raqqa.

      Q: Former administration officials have said at — at the time in January, when this decision was made, the — the opinion of both the joint staff and CENTCOM was that the Syrian Democratic Forces would be ready to begin the assault on Raqqa in mid-February. And here — here we are in — in mid-May.

      SEC. MATTIS: Yeah, David, because we’re getting into a more political area where we try to keep our apolitical military — (inaudible) — let me just say that any — any timelines that are given in war time should be taken with a degree of skepticism. We will try to brief you … but you’re dealing with a fundamentally unpredictable situation. (…) So they were not able to move more quickly into the attack on Raqqa for purely tactical and — and battlefield reasons.

      Q: General Dunford, you just said that you’ve already starting arming the SDF. Could you —

      GEN. DUNFORD: No, I didn’t. If I did — if I did, I misspoke. If I did, I misspoke.
      (…) We haven’t started doing that — to my knowledge. It should happen here very soon.

      Q: Could you please give us an assessment about the fall out or any fall out with Turkey? And I’d like to address this to — (inaudible).

      GEN. DUNFORD: I’ll talk about it from a military perspective.

      First and foremost, we have gone into this with the first principle that Turkey is an important ally and our long-term relationship with Turkey is critical and we were going to protect that. And I think as you may know, as a result, I’ve gone to Turkey, I believe nine times this year. I met with my counterpart over 15 times this year to make sure that we maintain a very close military to military relationship.

      We did have a different perspective on the best way to seize Raqqa. In our view, the only option that was viable was with the Syrian Democratic Forces and we are now taking place — taking measures on the ground to mitigate their concerns.

      For example, weapons getting into the hands of the PKK or moving into Turkey and we’ve taken steps to make sure that the Turks have transparency on — on what we’re doing and measures to take place that the equipment that we’re providing to the SDF is appropriate, only for operations in Raqqa and that it doesn’t find its way someplace else.

      Q: If I could have Mr. McGurk —

      MR. MCGURK: (…) A critical partner; we cannot defeat ISIS without Turkey and I consult with our colleagues there all the time. (…) I think there’s a parallel diplomatic track of course for the incredibly complex situation in Syria. That’s something that we are fully coordinated with on Turkey and particular the post-Raqqa phase, which I talked about stabilization. That is something where we’ll very closely coordinated with Turkey. (…)

      Q: I have a quick follow-up for each of you, actually.(…)

      GEN. DUNFORD: I misspoke and what I — what I really meant to say was we had stockpiled equipment and were prepared to quickly field it to the SDF. We haven’t started to provide it to the SDF yet.

      And that equipment is in the form of small arms, ammunition and machine guns and — as well as some equipment that will allow them to deal with the IED — the improvised explosive device threat. (…) And so we’ll be able to quickly transition — as they finish the isolation of Raqqa now and transition into the seizure of Raqqa, we’ll be able to take the president’s decision and quickly get that equipment to the SDF.

      Thanks for the chance to clarify that.
      (…)
      Q: And then, Mr. McGurk, actually, just on — I — I just want to be clear. Are you confirming that the Obama administration had made the decision to arm the YPG or to equip the YPG? (…)

      MR. MCGURK: No, that decision was made by President Trump.

      GEN. DUNFORD: Mr. Secretary, I — I just want to come back one last time to the SDF because it — it’s — it occurs to me that — that there may be a misunderstanding. There’s a Kurdish component of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and there’s an Arab component of the — of Syrian Democratic Forces.

      We have been providing equipment, weapons to the Arab component for some months. So, that’s been going on.

      The decision that President Trump made was to provide equipment to the Kurdish component of the — of the Syrian Democratic Forces. I just wanted to clarify that. It’s clear in my mind. I just want to make sure it’s clear in yours. Thanks.

      Next question. Yes, please?

      Q: (inaudible) — you’re describing, your first two points of what’s new on the ground;… — because President Trump campaigned on the idea that the ISIS war wasn’t working under Obama, not fast enough for him, there was going to be a major change, he even considered firing generals, So here we are now with — with your first comments. Should the American public think this is a major difference (…) ?

      SEC. MATTIS: I’m not quite sure of your question. I explained to you that we went to him with the situations we saw with suggested changes. He discussed these changes with us with the whole government not just the — not just the Department of Defense and we made the decision — he made the decision, we took the decision and executed for an accelerated campaign, (…) … no longer will we have slowed decision cycles because Washington D.C. has to authorize tactical movements on the ground. I have absolute confidence as does the president, our commander in chief, in the commanders on the ground as he’s proven by delegating this authority to me with the authority to further delegate it and they’ve carried it out aggressively.

      (Iran again)

      Q: I’d like to follow up about the Iranian aspect of this. Are you concerned — say in Iraq — that certain armed units have arisen in all this fighting whether it’s the (inaudible) — part of the — (inaudible) popular mobilization forces or the PKK’s presence in Sinjar, that the situation has allowed these armed groups to emerge and they’ll be difficult to control afterwards?

      SEC. MATTIS: The Iranian regime has been unhelpful. As you all know, some years ago when the Syrian people rose up against Assad, they would have been successful except for the Iranian reinforcements, full — full support for Assad. That’s the reason he was able to withstand that difficult time and be still in position now. So Iran’s activities have not been helpful.

      They’ve been hurtful, they’ve extended a war that should have ended long ago. (…)

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      • Klaus-Peter schreibt:

        Hossa. Danke!
        Zu bemerken sei evtl. noch, dass seit gestern abend viel gezwitschert wird, trotz allem stieße man weiter von syrischer wie auch irakischer Seite auf al-Tanf vor.

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