Rainer Hermann calls Afrin – Invasion Bluff

Berechenbare Vorstöße. Die detaillierten Angaben zum Kampfgeschehen bei ANF geben dem BND-Verbindungsmann recht. Es geschieht dasselbe, wie in all den Kriegsjahren seit dem Burgfrieden der YPG’s mit der Türkei in Serekaniye 2013 – und deutlich geringfügiger, als die türkischen Offensiven gegen Rojava im Herbst und Winter 2012 – nur ein wenig konzentrierter.

Auch eine Verlautbarung der türkischen Armeeführung gibt Hermann recht. Sie band die Operationen der Luftwaffe an „äußerste Sorgfalt und Rücksicht auf Zivilisten“. Ein großer Teil der YPG-Milizionäre sind Zivilisten und auch das Terrain ähnelt den operativen Voraussetzungen für die US-Luftwaffe in Afghanistan. Immerhin vorübergehende Erfolge von Luftangriffen kann der Angreifer nur erhoffen, wenn er auf alles feuern läßt, was sich bewegt. Die Alternative wäre ein breiter, mit mehrfach überlegenen Kräften vorgetragener, luftunterstützer Panzervorstoß auf die Hauptorte der Provinz. Der bleibt aus, möglicherweise deshalb, weil Erdogan fürchten muß, daß ein Flüchtlingsstrom von 100 Tausend in Richtung Aleppo – Manbij seine Parteigänger im Pentagon in eine unhaltbare Position bringt.

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4 Antworten zu Rainer Hermann calls Afrin – Invasion Bluff

  1. tgarner9 schreibt:

    Leseempfehlung zur Stellung der YPG – Führung zur SDF, SAA, US-Streitkräften und Shia – Milizen.
    Bedeutsam: Die YPG-Führung behandelte Erdogans Ankündigungen schon zu Beginn der Afrin-Operationen als Bluff. Wer gab ihnen die Versicherung?
    http://www.aymennjawad.org/2018/01/interview-with-the-ypg-spokesman

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  2. tgarner9 schreibt:

    Das Narrativ des Atlantic – Council zeigt m.E. einen Teil der Triebkräfte hinter dem offenkundig irrationalen türkischen Vorgehen. Ausschnitte:

    „Turkey found itself in an isolated position within NATO after the US left Turkey to stand up to Russia alone following the Turkish downing of a Russian jet in November 2015. The United States, with Europe following suit, withdrew from the Syrian conflict, allowing Russia to intervene militarily, exhausting the Syrian opposition to face the Syrian regime and its allied militias, Iranian-backed militias, and Russian airpower.
    This Turkish-Russian rapprochement manifested itself more clearly during the Astana talks, as Turkey found itself in the challenging position of the guarantor that ensured the Syrian opposition implemented the so-called de-escalation agreement. Turkey pressured the opposition into taking part in the Astana talks, and the opposition was unable to oppose Turkish pressure; Turkey had agreed that Iran, alongside Russia, would be a guarantor to the Astana talks. (…) Turkey is the opposition’s closest ally and is also the only land passage by which weapons, ammunition, and humanitarian aid can cross into the liberated parts of Syria. As such, any tension between opposition groups and Turkey would have negative consequences for the wider revolution …
    Save for Syria, Russia has no foothold in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and therefore does not want to see the Syrian regime fall, as this would spell the end for Russian presence in the region … Turkey does not enjoy good relations with the international actors involved in Syria including the United States, Europe, and Saudi Arabia … It was in this context that the Russians exploited Turkish desire to distance the United States and other regional and international actors from the situation in Syria as much as possible. This, however, will render Turkey weak in the face of Russia and Iran both politically and militarily, … Russia has also contrived to entangle Turkey in a number of issues … The first of these issues was the Turkish regime’s unwillingness to fight Syrian regime forces when they cut off the path to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) during the battle of the Euphrates Shield … leaving the FSA unable to proceed in fighting ISIS in the countryside around eastern Aleppo and west of Raqqa … The most significant situation was Turkey’s acceptance of Iran as a guarantor in the Astana talks … Turkey also took no action following the serious violations and massacres perpetrated by the regime and its Russian and Iranian allies … Russia also put considerable pressure on Turkey to fight Jabhat al-Nusra in Idlib on the basis that it is a terrorist organization. However, this never came to fruition, with Turkey instead limiting its actions to a few observation posts in northwest Aleppo overlooking the front line with SDF troops in Afrin. Turkey’s exposure as a weak player in the face of Russia and Iran has led a number of armed opposition groups, key figures in the Syrian revolution, and a broad swathe of Syrian society to lose faith in Turkey’s ability to secure gains on their behalf in the war, or at least to stop the losses. …
    What the battle for Afrin might look like is not yet clear, as the mobilization and military preparations seen so far are not yet in keeping with official Turkish statements on the matter. … The battle may be restricted to establishing control of the city of Tal Rifat and the ten surrounding villages which the SDF took control of in 2016. … The Turkish forces may then proceed towards Sheikh Uqayl Mountain to the west of Aleppo where they established an observation post in November 2017. In this way, the Turkish forces would have connected the countryside north and west of Aleppo to a narrow land passage which would fall between the regime forces to its east and the SDF to its west. This latter option would be preferable to the Syrian revolution and the FSA units who (then could open) a route to Aleppo’s western countryside and Idlib. …
    … the military priority for the Syrian opposition is putting pressure on the regime forces to reduce the severity of the siege on Eastern Ghouta, … the SDF have built a formidable defensive line in the Afrin area consisting of trenches and tunnels … Russia (might prefer) to leave Turkey in a costly and difficult situation fighting the SDF. Perhaps Russia will even secretly provide the SDF with weapons and ammunition …

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  3. tgarner9 schreibt:

    Einige Leser greifen auf den alten Eintrag „Syrien entstaatlicht (3)“ zurück. Das ist ok, doch aktueller ist sein Vorgänger:
    https://tomgard.blog/2017/05/05/amerikanische-geiselnahme-rojavas-ist-halbamtlich/

    Vergleicht dazu:

    Gefällt mir

  4. Pingback: Emmanuel Macron will in Syrien ein Protektorat, eine imperiale Provinz errichten | Themen & Essays

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