Israel-Syrien

Freihändige Bemerkungen zur Geschichte des Syrienkrieges

(TP-Kommentare Sept.16)

Mitte August 2012 erschien ein ziemlich umfangreiches Papier mit einem „Democratic transition plan“ unter Federführung der binationalen deutsch-amerikanischen Projektgruppe „The Day After“:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Day_After:_Supporting_a_Democratic_Transition_in_Syria
Schirmherren der Projektgruppe waren das US Institute for Peace (USIP) und die deutsche Bundesregierung, vertreten von der „Deutschen Gesellschaft für Internationale Politik“ (DGAP). Die Bundesregierung wollte offenbar vermeiden, offiziell als Schirmherr neben dem USIP aufzutreten, das als ein dem Weißen Haus verpflichtetes Konkurrenzprojekt zu Think Tanks der CIA und des DoS gilt, so trat der Öffentlichkeit gegenüber das SWP in die Rolle der DGAP ein. Später beteiligte sich auch die dänische Regierung an dem Projekt. „Draußen bleiben“ mußten die Killarys, das UK und Frankreich.
Schon dies ist Indiz genug, daß im Hintergrund ein Machtkampf zwischen dem Weißen Haus und DoS und CIA stand. Führt man sich das Papier zu Gemüte und vergleicht es den „Vorschlägen“, von denen Pany berichtet, wird das noch deutlicher. Auch „The Day After“ lieferte das Ergebnis eines monatelangen Sandkastenspieles aus, aber es war ein ernsthaftes Sandkastenspiel, das einige politologische Substanz ins Feld führte. Der größte Unterschied zum Zeugs des HNC besteht darin, daß „TDA“ einer zentralen Forderung säkularer syrischer Oppositioneller und der syrischen Regierung folgte:
Eine „Politische Lösung“ des Krieges dürfe und könne keinerlei auswärtige Diktate oder Vorentscheidungen enthalten, sie habe ohne Abstriche „syrisch“ zu sein.
Hören wir dazu den syrischen Vizepräsidenten Farouk Al-Sharaa:in einem Interview mit der libanesischen „Al Akhbar“ 8 Wochen nach Veröffentlichung des TDA-Papiers:

“Any logic based on the premise of rejecting dialogue indicates the desire for Syrians not to reach a solution on their own. Therefore, any settlement, whether starting with talks or agreements between Arab, regional, or foreign capitals, cannot exist without a solid Syrian foundation. The solution has to be Syrian, but through a historic settlement, which would include the main regional countries, and the members of UN Security Council. This settlement must include stopping all shapes of violence, and the creation of a national unity government with wide powers. This should be accompanied by the resolution of sensitive dossiers related to the lives of people and their legitimate demands.”

http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/exclusive-interview-syrian-vp-farouk-al-sharaa-proposes-alternative-war

Verblüffend, nicht wahr? Das ist die abstrakte Blaupause des dieses Jahr unter der Sabotage des HNC und seines Schirmherrn KSA, des DoS und der türkischen Regierung abgebrochenen „Fahrplans“ der Genfer Verhandlungen.
Ich komme auf Al-Sharaa zurück, doch zunächst muß vom KSA-Agenten an der Spitze des HNC die Rede sein, von Riyad Farid Hijab.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riyad_Farid_Hijab
und zuvor von einem anderen, prominenten syrischen „Fahnenflüchtigen“, dem ehemaligen Botschafter im Irak, Nawaf al-Fares:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nawaf_al-Fares

Fares war politischer Chef der syrischen Al Jarrah, eines Stammesverbandes, deren Hauptsitze in der irakischen Provinz Anbar liegen und der Teil der Egaidat tribal confederation ist, mit ca. 1,5 Mio Mitgliedern einer der bedeutensten in Syrien, mit Zentrum in Deir Ezzor.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18806469
Die meisten der arabischen Stammesverbände in Syrien – mit Ausnahme der Baggara, die vorwiegend im Irak und in der Türkei präsent sind – haben politisch und ökonomisch wirksame Verbindungen nach Saudi Arabien und in die Golf-Staaten, v.a. Kuweit und Qatar. Hassan Hassan, das CIA- und Atlantic Council Asset, das meine Leser schon kennen, warb Ende Juli 2012 in einem Guardian-Artikel, der durch viele Organe der „Freunde Syriens“ durchgereicht wurde, für den „Hebel“, welche die syrischen Stammesorganisationen der „Revolution“ schon boten und weiter und verstärkt bieten sollten:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/25/syria-tribal-rivalries-shape-future
Fares eilte sofort nach seiner Flucht zum Interview mit der BBC, um für die offizielle Bewaffung der syrischen Opposition und bei fortgesetztem Widerstand des „Regime“ für eine Intervention zu werben. Dabei brachte er das „Leitthema“ der inneramerikanischen Auseinandersetzungen um einen Bombenkrieg gegen Damaskus auf, der die ganzen kommenden 18 Monate beherrschen sollte:

Assad regime ‚ready to use chemical weapons‘

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18864629

Riyad Farid Hijab, geboren in Deir Ezzor, ist offiziell kein Mitglied einer Stammesorganisation, aber er war von 2004 bis 2008 Parteichef der Baath in dieser Provinzhauptstadt, und diese Position konnte er nicht einnehmen, ohne sich mit den Stammesführern ins Benehmen zu setzen. Hijabs erste „Amtshandlung“ nach seiner Desertion, einige Wochen nach Fares, war eine Reise nach Doha (Qatar) zu „Geheimgesprächen“ über eine künftige „Vereinigung aller oppositionellen Kräfte Syriens“:
http://www.webcitation.org/6A17pveXq

Halten wir fest: Während USIP und DGAP mit „TDA“ furchtbar ernsthafte Sandkastenspiele mit im europäischen und libanesischen Exil lebenden Vertretern und Fachleuten der säkularen politischen Opposition veranstalteten, dessen Ergebnis bis heute die nominelle Blaupause für die vom Weißen Haus vorgegebene Syrienpolitik ist, haben die GCC-Staaten unter der offenen Ermunterung und Führung Killarys auf Regime-Change durch das Chaos gesetzt, das sie mit Hilfe von Al Nusra und anderen jihadistischen Banden, vielen Millionen Bestechungsgeldern und Mrd.-Summen für Bewaffnung und mit dem Einsatz der ethnischen und sektiererische Brechstange über die arabischen Stammesverbindungen stiften konnten. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Sharaa’s vorsichtige Worte im o.zit. Interview zu lesen:

“[The militarization of the opposition] should have required a discussion of mechanisms and an attempt at a Syrian-Syrian solution. The dialogue we adopted in July 2011 aimed at solving the crisis politically from the start, by Syrian hands,” he adds.

“But things did not go in this direction,” Sharaa explains. “The crisis was Arabized. Syria, a founding member of the League of Arab States, saw its membership suspended from the league without justification or a pretext that could convince Syrian citizens.”

“There were many mistakes made by the Arab League and the [Syrian] state both, which cannot be forgotten or stepped over,” he surmises.

So erklärt sich der scheinbare Widerspruch, daß Sharaa einerseits auf einer innersyrischen Lösung bestand, andererseits die Einbeziehung des UN-Sicherheitsrates und der Großmächte, die doch für die Lage maßgeblich verantwortlich waren, einforderte: Die gestifteten und benutzten innerarabischen Fronten waren seiner Ansicht nach nicht länger ohne militärpolitisches Diktat der Großmächte zu zügeln.

Bevor ich mich den Folgen und dem Schicksal der Bemühungen Hijabs und anderer um eine „Einigung der Opposition“ widme, ist die Rolle Farouk Al-Sharaa’s selbst zu betrachten. Denn der Vizepräsident wurde in den Monaten vor dem Interview selbst als „Dissident“, „Deserteur“ und mögliches Haupt einer von den „Freuden Syriens“ akzeptierten Putsch- oder Übergangsregierung gehandelt.und die politische Statur und Vergangenheit Sharaa’s ließen auch vor seinem Interview mit Al Akhbar kaum vernünftige Zweifel zu, daß er sich vielleicht als eine Integrationsfigur für alle syrischen Fraktionen hergeben würde – obwohl er das stets bestritten hat – es aber weder mit Hijab und seinen Hinterleuten halten würde, noch ein Parteigänger der Führungsfiguren der LCC’s werden würde, die eine beträchtliche Rolle in der „TDA“-Initiative des Weißen Hauses spielten, oder sonst irgend einer syrischen Fraktion seine politische Physiognomie leihen würde.
Ibrahim al-Amin hatte dazu geschrieben:

Farouk al-Sharaa is at the heart of the action, but not in the decision-making circles. He keeps in touch with a few officials, speaks to President from time to time, and communicates with some of the leadership …he also keeps communication channels open with members of the opposition and figures who are not connected to the state or the regime … He stood by Bashar al-Assad from the very first moment, seeing in him a chance for change and moving Syria somewhere more advanced. But since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, he felt that the odds are not in his favor.

Die unzweideutige, wenngleich ein wenig versteckt geäußerte Kritik Sharaa’s an Assad lautete wie folgt:

“If anyone has the chance to meet Mister President, he would hear from him that this is a long struggle, a big conspiracy with many actors (terrorists, rabble, smugglers). He does not hide his desire for a military solution that achieves a decisive victory, and only then would the political dialogue be actually possible. Many in the [Baath] party, the [National Progressive] Front (NPF), and the military forces have been convinced from the onset of the crisis that there is no alternative to a political solution and that there is no turning back,” he adds. … “In 1970, many state institutions were built on top of the inconsistencies and conflicts of the revolutionary command council back then …These institutions started to deteriorate and were not renewed, despite multiple attempts to restructure them since president Bashar al-Assad assumed leadership in the year 2000.
“These institutions then started to function based on their own inertia. This could be partially acceptable in times of stability and … security. But how could it happen during major crises and the resulting destruction … ? “This is not to mention the detention of thousands of people who are not presented in front of the courts, as if we are still under martial law.” … “I do not deny that some of us acted as if [the dialogue] was unnecessary and whispered this to the leadership. So it distanced itself under the pretext that the internal and external opposition saw it as one of the regime’s charades. In the end, this finished off the political dialogue and opened the doors wide for the dialogue of bullets and guns. … Today, we understand that change is inevitable. If the regime does not take the initiative to achieve it with the others, it will happen through unilateral dictates from them.”

Ich mußte das u.a. deshalb so ausführlich zitieren, weil Sharaa’s Darstellung eine gähnende Lücke aufweist, die der Leser füllen muß, um seine Worte wägen zu können. Ich rede vom bis heute rätselhaften Attentat auf die militärische Führungsspitze Syriens am 18. Juli 2012, also etwa eine Woche nach der Desertion von Farouq al-Fares und einem anderen Prominenten, von dem zu reden sein wird, Manaf Tlass.
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/krieg-in-syrien-anschlag-assads-schwager-und-verteidigungsminister-getoetet/6892312.html
Das Attentat räumte einige der übelsten Figuren der syrischen Militärdespotie beiseite, darunter Assads sprichwörtlich dummen, bösartigen und brutalisierten Bruder Maher, der seither nicht mehr offiziell in Erscheinung getreten ist:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maher_al-Assad
In der Rolle des Führers der Präsidentengarde repräsentierte Maher die beständige Bedrohung des Präsidenten mit einem Putsch der Luftwaffengeneräle, die den Kern der syrischen Militärdepotie bilden.
In Spekulationen über die Urheber des Attentates will ich mich nicht einmischen, aber die „Lücke“ in Sharaa’s Darlegung besteht darin, daß Assad das Attentat nicht nutzte, die „Kräfte der Beharrung“ und der brutalen Inkompetenz, die der Vizepräsident umschreibt, maßgeblich zu schwächen. Assad ersetzte die Getöteten durch „bewährte“ Technokraten der Macht.
Und das wird mich – allerdings erst morgen, für heute wird mir das zu viel – zur vereitelten Rolle von Manaf Tlass führen, die zu würdigen nicht entbehrlich ist, wenn es um die Radikalisierung der Intervention erst mit Hilfe der Muslimbrüder, dann unter massiven Zufluss von Takfiris aller Provenienz geht.

Bis dahin lasse ich euch mit einem Interview und einer Darstellung aus dem Dunstkreis des MI6 allein, denen ihr entnehmen könnt, daß Assad’s und Sharaa’s Differenzen in keiner Weise grundsätzlicher Natur waren.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/8857883/Syrias-President-Assad-I-live-a-normal-life-its-why-Im-popular.html

(2018: Das WSJ-Interview vom Jahreswechsel 2010/11 ist hinter der Paywall, aber es ist eines der sprechensten Dokumente der Kriegsgeschichte.
Den Artikel  von Andrew Gilligan v. Okt.2011 spiegele ich jetzt:

When you go to see an Arab ruler, you expect vast, over-the-top palaces, battalions of guards, ring after ring of security checks and massive, deadening protocol. You expect to wait hours in return for a few stilted minutes in a gilded reception room, surrounded by officials, flunkies and state TV cameras. You expect a monologue, not a conversation. Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, was quite different.

The young woman who arranged the meeting picked me up in her own car. We drove for 10 minutes, then turned along what looked like a little-used side road through the bushes. There was no visible security, not even a gate, just a man dressed like a janitor, standing by a hut. We drove straight up to a single-storey building the size of a largeish suburban bungalow. The president was waiting in the hall to meet us.

We sat, just the three of us, on leather sofas in Assad’s small study. The president was wearing jeans. It was Friday, the main protest day in Syria: the first Friday since the death of Colonel Gaddafi had sunk in. But the man at the centre of it all, the man they wanted to destroy, looked pretty relaxed.

He thought the protests were diminishing. After they started, in March, “we didn’t go down the road of stubborn government. Six days after [the protests began] I commenced reform. People were sceptical that the reforms were an opiate for the people, but when we started announcing the reforms, the problems started decreasing… This is when the tide started to turn. This is when people started supporting the government… [but] being in the middle is very difficult when you have this strong polarisation.”

The problems were not mainly political, he thought. “It’s about the whole of society, the development of society. Different problems have erupted as one crisis. We adopted liberal economics. To open your economy without preparing yourself, you open up gaps between the social strata. If you do not get the right economic model, you cannot get past the problem.”

For Assad’s critics – who have expanded steadily over the last seven months to include not just the protesters, but Britain, France, the US, the United Nations and now the Arab League – these statements are simply delusional. “He has been talking about reform ever since he came to office [in 2000], and nothing serious ever happens,” said one of the protest leaders from the key opposition city of Homs. “Killing people is not an act of reform. We aren’t calling for economic or even political reform under Assad, but for the departure of this bloodstained president and free elections.”

The opposition appears, after a dip, to have been energised by Gaddafi’s demise. The death toll on Friday, they say, of 40, was the highest since April. Three thousand demonstrators have been killed by Assad’s security forces since March, according to the UN, a figure that includes 187 children. Yesterday, it was reported, the Syrian army was shelling civilian areas of Homs.

Yet Assad still has a number of cards that Libya’s recently-deceased colonel never possessed. Unlike Libya, the country is neither religiously nor ethnically homogeneous. For the moment, the regime appears still to be persuading many of Syria’s Christian and Alawite minority – together with some in the Sunni majority – that it is their best choice.

On Thursday night, the beginning of the Muslim weekend, Damascus’s Old City was heaving with people having a good time. Men and women were mixing freely. Alcohol was widely available. A pair of Christian Orthodox priests, in their long cassocks, walked through the crowded alleys, and small Christian shrines were tucked away in the corners. The regime is successfully pushing the message that all this is at risk. “I don’t like Assad, but I am worried that what follows could be worse,” said one of the partygoers. On Wednesday, Damascus witnessed a large pro-Assad demonstration: Western journalists who observed it say that the participants did not appear to have been coerced.

Assad himself could not be further from a ranting, Gaddafi-like Arab dictator. His English is perfect — he lived for two years in London, where he met his wife. In conversation he was open, even at times frank. “Many mistakes,” he admitted, had been made by the security forces – though no one, it seems, has been brought to book for them. He could both make, and take, a joke. A former president of the Syrian Computer Society, he sometimes explained things in computer terms.

Comparing Syria’s leadership with that of a Western country, he said, was like comparing a Mac with a PC. “Both computers do the same job, but they don’t understand each other,” he said. “You need to translate. If you want to analyse me as the East, you cannot analyse me through the Western operating system, or culture. You have to translate according to my operating system, or culture.” That’s the inner nerd in you speaking, I said, and he laughed out loud. I can’t imagine too many other Arab leaders you could get away with calling a nerd.

Assad lives in a relatively small house in a normal – albeit guarded – street. He believes that his modest lifestyle is another component of his appeal. “There is a legitimacy according to elections and there is popular legitimacy,” he said. “If you do not have popular legitimacy, whether you are elected or not you will be removed – look at all the coups we had.

“The first component of popular legitimacy is your personal life. It is very important how you live. I live a normal life. I drive my own car, we have neighbours, I take my kids to school. That’s why I am popular. It is very important to live this way – that is the Syrian style.”

That might not amount to much against the pile of corpses in Homs, Hama, and elsewhere, but from conversations with residents in Damascus at least, it does in fact seem to make Assad somewhat better esteemed by his own people than many other Arab rulers.

Where is Syria going now? Homs, at least, may be heading out of the regime’s control. “Unlike any other large city, Homs is in complete revolt,” says Malik al-Abdeh, a leading London-based opposition figure who keeps in close touch with the city. “It’s been proving very difficult for the regime to control it.”

But elsewhere the regime appears to retain greater control. “Overall the regime has been quite cohesive,” says Mr al-Abdeh. “The military hasn’t deserted in large numbers.”

Kadri Jamil, an opposition figure in Damascus, says: “After seven months, we see that the government cannot stop the popular movement, but the popular movement cannot stop the government.”

There is disagreement about what to do next. Dr Jamil, and some of those who operate openly inside Syria, say the answer is genuine dialogue with, and reform from, the regime. “The problem is that the dialogue [offered so far] is shallow and just a tool to gain time,” says Jamil. “The government is not acting fast enough. They have one to two months before passing the point of no return.”

Malik al-Abdeh and others involved in the street protests dismiss any thought of talking to the government and say its killings have put it beyond the point of no return already. The first people to apply under a new law supposedly permitting demonstrations were arrested, they point out. For all the talk of new parties, regime sources say that Article 8 of the Syrian constitution, which says that Assad’s Ba’ath party must lead, is unlikely to be changed in substantial form.

Increasingly, therefore, the protest wing of the opposition are talking about something they previously resisted: foreign intervention. “They are more willing to entertain the idea,” said Mr al-Abdeh. “People want at the very least some kind of no-fly zone that legitimises an armed uprising against Bashar, or maybe some other kind of intervention that will encourage people in the regime to jump ship.”

Last Friday’s demonstrations called for such a no-fly zone.

Last week, after the success of military intervention in Libya, the former Republican presidential candidate, John McCain, became the first mainstream US figure to canvass the idea. One suggestion is that foreign air power could enforce some sort of enclave inside Syria which would become the country’s “Benghazi,” a base for operations against the government.

The regime’s response to this new danger appears two-fold. Last week, some Damascus-based opposition groups were allowed to hold a press conference in the capital. They criticised the government, calling for the release of political prisoners and the end of security force violence — but also, crucially, attacked any form of foreign intervention and demanded only an “internal solution” to the crisis.

Kadri Jamil and others are fiercely critical of the Syrian National Council, the new Turkey-based opposition umbrella group.

Malik al-Abdeh and other people allied to the SNC, which represents, they say, “80 per cent” of the Syrian opposition, decry figures like Jamil as regime stooges. “People like that are very useful for Bashar at this stage,” al-Abdeh says. “I don’t think they enjoy popular support.”

The regime’s other tactic is to issue dire warnings to the West about the perils of involvement in a place this complicated. As President Assad told The Sunday Telegraph: “Syria is the hub now in this region. It is the faultline, and if you play with the ground you will cause an earthquake…. Do you want to see another Afghanistan, or tens of Afghanistans?”

Such fears are real, which may explain why there has been so little Western enthusiasm, so far, for the military option, or for the SNC – which has only been recognised by one country, Libya, to date.

The practical difficulties are also formidable. Libyan regime forces were comparatively weak. To move between towns, they needed to cross empty desert in which they could be relatively easily attacked from the air.

Syria’s forces are much stronger, and the population centres clustered much more closely together.

Yet there is growing concern that the violence of the regime, and the increasing counter-violence of some of the opposition, could lead to a sort of “earthquake” anyway: civil or sectarian war across at least some of the country. There seems, from Damascus at least, still to be limited space for real reform and change to be made. But it needs to be done quickly. )

Im Vorgriff auch noch einen lakonischen Hinweis darauf, wer an vorderster Front ein Interesse daran hatte, daß sowohl die USIP-Initiative, noch andere Befriedungsversuche, an denen Leute, wie Sharaa beteiligt sein würden, scheitern sollten:

(AP) ( Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa:) „Prime Minister Netanyahu in Washington claimed that he wanted to withdraw from the south of Lebanon but Syria does not facilitate that withdrawal. In fact Netanyahu’s claim is not accurate at all. It is misleading and it is as well an attempt to underestimate the intelligence of the Arabs and the international community as well. If he really wants to withdraw from the south of Lebanon he doesn’t require any approval or consent of Syria or any other party.“ SUPER CAPTION: Farouk al-Sharaa, Syrian Foreign Minister Prime Minister Netanyahu refuses to be bound by the previous Israeli government’s unwritten pledge to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights, which he regards as strategically vital to Israel’s security. He has indicated a readiness to withdraw from only part of the plateau in return for security guarantees from Syria, a compromise rejected by al-Sharaa. SOUNDBITE: (English) „If a part of the Golan Heights will remain under the occupation then how would the Syrians feel they have reached peace with Israel in any peace agreement? They would feel that the occupation is still there, that the state of war is still there and no state of peace is a real one. So in their mind the Israelis – especially Netanyahu and his government – want to maintain occupation at least for a part of the Golan. In this case this means a total rejection of the essence of peace, the essence of comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.“ SUPER CAPTION: Farouk al-Sharaa, Syrian Foreign Minister Israel has occupied a border enclave in southern Lebanon since 1985 to protect northern Israeli communities from attacks by Iranian-backed militants. Al-Sharaa said it would be unrealistic to expect Syria to guarantee Israel’s northern border following an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon if Israel still controlled the Golan Heights. SOUNDBITE: (English) SUPER CAPTION: Farouk al-Sharaa, Syrian Foreign Minister A final, comprehensive Middle East settlement depends on the fate of the Golan Heights.

Zum letzten Punkt auch noch ein symptomatisches Beispiel für die Aufnahme, die Sharaa’s selbstverständlich strategisch gezielte Erklärung an die arabische und westliche Öffentlichkeit in den westlichen Leitmedien fand.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2013/07/09/Farouk-al-Sharaa-Syrian-leader-who-wanted-compromise-.html
Viel anders oder besser ging übrigens auch die russische Auslandspresse nicht damit um – nur mit entgegen gesetztem Vorzeichen.

Das Material, das ich für die Fortsetzung benutzen wollte, finde ich im Moment nicht, will aber auch nicht darauf verzichten. Vielleicht finde ich es heut nachmittag.
Stattdessen einstweilen zwei Splitter zu den Voraussetzungen der Rolle Manaf Tlass’s, aber auch der diversen Islamistenfraktionen.

Das eine ist ein Reuters-Artikel vom Ende April 2012, der beklagt, daß nach der Niederlage der „Homs Offensive“ Mitte April kein sonderlich taugliches Kanonenfutter mehr für den Syrienkrieg verfügbar war:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-rebels-idUSBRE83Q0S120120427
Rebel rivalry and suspicions threaten Syria revolt
Stattdessen bunte Haufen entwurzelter und versprengter Schurken – Schmuggler, Diebe, Vergewaltiger, kurz, Raubzeug aller Art, das sich jedem zu verpflichten versprach, der es mit Geld und Waffen versorgte, einschließlich den takfirischen Ideologien der Anbieter.

Die Homs – Offensive
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Homs_offensive
war von der Allianz Killary, Sarkozy, Cameron organisiert worden. Vor Ort, im Libanon, waren vor allem Jeffrey Feltman und Saad Hariri zuständig. Das auswärtige Personal wurde überwiegend aus Entwurzelten des Libyenkrieges rekrutiert. Der nominelle Dachverband der auswärtigen und einheimischen Banden war die Farouq-Brigade
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farouq_Brigades
die später eine maßgebliche Rolle in den Kämpfen und Rivalitäten zwischen der Türkei, Qatar und Saudi Arabien um bestimmenden Einfluß auf den Syrienkrieg spielen sollte. Ihren Frontmann spielte der blutjunge Lieutenant Abdul Razzaq Tlass, ein Cousin von Manaf Tlass, der zu dieser Zeit noch kein takfirisches Image angenommen hatte und keinen Sektenkrieg gegen die Alaviten propagierte, wie wenige Monate später.

Dieser „Gesinnungswandel“ fiel bemerkenswerterweise mit der Ende Juli, zwei Wochen nach Manaf Tlass Flucht über Beirut, Istanbul nach Paris erfolgten und verkündeten Entscheidung seines älteren Bruders und syrischen Top-Oligarchen, Firas Tlass zusammen, die Farouq-Brigade aus eigenen und qatarischen Portefeuilles mit einer gewaltigen Millionen-Summe zu sponsern, was aus ihr eine der einflussreichsten Proxy-Verbände machte, die in Zentral- und Nordsyrien saudisch gesponserten Verbänden, insbesondere Liwa al Islam und Al Nusra, die Stirn zu bieten vermochte.

Ergänzend noch dies:

Mit Ausnahme der Muslimbruderschaft war und ist eine „Opposition“ am Syrienkrieg unbeteiligt
von TomGard 2012-07-01
Das bestätigte Aron Lund in einer im Mai erschienenen, für die Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Olof Palme International Center erstellten Studie, die einen Überblick über die oppositionellen Kräfte in Syrien zu geben versucht.
An den dem Mythos nach „initialen“ Ereignissen in Daraa, an denen sich „die Revolution entzündet“ habe, war nur eine kleine Gruppe von Parteigängern des exilierten Oppositionspolitikers Haytham Manaa beteiligt, der im März dieses Jahres mit einem furiosen Wutausbruch an die Öffentlichkeit trat:

„Raus mit den Dschihadisten und ausländischen Killern! … Wir werden aus Syrien kein zweites Bosnien machen lassen!“

(Das Video ist natürlich nicht mehr verfügbar ..TG ’16)
Lund resümiert:

In fact, the traditional political opposition was caught unprepared by the outbreak of revolution. It has been too weak in terms of numbers, organization and resources to significantly contribute to – not to mention control – anti-regime activity on the ground. This situation generally persists in early 2012.

„Anti-regime activity“ ist folglich bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt ausschließlich ein vom Ausland gestiftetes und aufgestocktes kriminelles Bandenwesen gewesen – ganz, wie Bashar al-Assad nicht müde wird, zu behaupten.
„Übergangsregierung“, hm? Wer die wohl „machen“ soll?

(Auch die Lund-Studie ist offenbar aus dem Netz gesäubert)

Das Material, das ich ‚raussuchen wollte – und immer noch nicht wiederfand – galt der Struktur, dem Zusammenwirken und der Balance der Abteilungen der syrischen Streitkräfte in der ständischen Despotie des Militärs. Es sollte zeigen, warum jemand, der dringend nach einer „jemenitischen Lösung“ des Dilemmas suchte, in dem das Imperium steckte, nachdem Obama sich Killary’s Diagnose „Assad ist entbehrlich“ (April oder Mai ’11) mit einem „Assad muß weg“ angeschlossen hatte, die killary’sche Angriffswelle in Homs jedoch gestoppt worden war, notwendig auf Manaf Tlass als einem potentiellen Garanten für einen Fortbestand des syrischen Repressionsapparates verfallen mußte.

Auf dieser Grundlage wollte ich induktiv zeigen, wer die treibende Kraft war, eine „jemenitische Lösung“ zu vereiteln, in der Sharaa sich wahrscheinlich mehr oder minder widerwillig beteiligt hätte.
Doch bei der Suche nach verschwundenen Links merkte ich, daß das inzwischen überflüssig ist:

Bringing down Assad would not only be a massive boon to Israel’s security, it would also ease
Israel’s understandable fear of losing its nuclear monopoly. Then, Israel and the United States
might be able to develop a common view of when the Iranian program is so dangerous that
military action could be warranted. Right now, it is the combination of Iran’s strategic alliance
with Syria and the steady progress in Iran’s nuclear enrichment program that has led Israeli
leaders to contemplate a surprise attack — if necessary over the objections of Washington. With
Assad gone, and Iran no longer able to threaten Israel through its, proxies, it is possible that the
United States and Israel can agree on red lines for when Iran’s program has crossed an
unacceptable threshold. In short, the White House can ease the tension that has developed with
Israel over Iran by doing the right thing in Syria.

Killary in einer Mail an einen unbekannten Empfänger Ende April 2012:
https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/HRCEmail_NovWeb/293/DOC_0C05794498/C05794498.pdf
siehe auch:
https://www.jungewelt.de/2016/07-06/021.php
Für dieses Ziel war eine Art „Regierung der nationalen Errettung“, in der arabisch – syrische Nationalisten auf der Grundlage von Programmen, wie USIP es vorschlug, eine führende Rolle eingenommen hätten, ganz und gar ungeeignet.
Siehe dazu:
Ehud Barak (auf den Clinton in der Mail Bezug nimmt) im April ’12:
AMANPOUR. Latest full-length edition: Ehud Barak
(Die Videos sind gelöscht, aber vielleicht findet sie jemand an anderem Ort)

  1. Mai ’12
    http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Syrian-Kurdish-dissident-Break-Syria-into-pieces
    Sherkoh Abbas, a veteran Syrian Kurdish dissident, called on Israel this week to support the break-up of Syria into a series of federal structures based on the country’s various ethnicities (…).
    Abbas, who heads the Washington- based Kurdistan National Assembly, said that dismantling Syria into ethnic enclaves with a federal administration would serve to “break the link” between Syria and the Iran-led “Shi’a crescent.”
    Syrian Kurdish, Druse, Alawite and Sunni Arab federal areas, he suggested, would have no interest in aligning with Iran.
    At the same time, a federalized Syria would avoid the possibility of a resurgent, Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Sunni Islamist Syria emerging as a new challenge to Israel and the West.
    “We need to break Syria into pieces,” Abbas said.
    The Syrian Kurdish dissident argued that a federal Syria, separated into four or five regions on an ethnic basis, would also serve as a natural “buffer” for Israel against both Sunni and Shi’ite Islamist forces. (…)
    His remarks came in response to a meeting at the US State Department last week between American officials and representatives of the Kurdish National Council, a Syrian Kurdish body. Robert Ford, who left his post as US ambassador to Syria earlier this year, and Fred Hof, the administration’s special coordinator on Syria, took part in the meeting. State Department Deputy Spokesman Mark Toner described its purpose as part of “ongoing efforts… to help the Syrian opposition build a more cohesive opposition to Assad.”
    Abbas, however, was more blunt in his description of the meeting’s purpose. It was held, he said, so that the US officials could tell the Kurdish representatives, “You should be part of the Syrian National Council.”
    So far, only one Syrian Kurdish organization – the Future Movement of Fares Tammo – has elected to join the SNC.
    Many Kurds distrust the SNC because of the strong presence of Muslim Brotherhood members in its leadership, and because of its close links to the government of Turkey.
    SNC leader Burhan Ghalioun has rejected the existence of any region called “Kurdistan” within Syria. He has called on Syrian Kurds to abandon what he called the “useless illusion” of federalism.
    Early Kurdish recruits to the council withdrew from it after failing to secure a commitment to change the name of a post-Assad Syria from the current Syrian Arab Republic to the plain “Syrian Republic.” The SNC has also made no commitment to Kurdish autonomy in a post-Assad Syria. (…)

  2. Juli:
    WJC ANALYSIS – Slicing Syria
    https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/wjc-analysis-slicing-syria?printable=true
    Over the past few decades, Lebanon has been the go-to place for internal struggles between Arab states. Arab nations would use their proxies in Lebanon in order to underscore a point in a larger confrontation with their neighboring states. When Syria and Saudi Arabia sought to avoid all-out war, the two rivals sent their representatives to fight in Lebanon, at that country’s expense, instead of sacrificing their home soil.

Thus, the Lebanese civil war saw Palestinians, Amal Shiites and Christians fight on Syria’s behalf, and Fatah-affiliated Palestinians, Sunnis and Christians do Saudi Arabia’s bidding.

Later, after Iran gathered momentum, Hezbollah won the day in Lebanon. Today, it is Syria that finds itself at the forefront of regional power struggles. However, unlike the conflicts in Lebanon, which were intended to preserve the status quo in the region, the multi-pronged struggle in Syria centers around the conflicting ideas of altering the situation in the war-torn country.

Many regional and external actors are involved in the Syrian tragedy. On the one side is President Assad’s bloody regime propped up by Syria’s traditional allies – Iran, Russia, and China. The rebels are supported by the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Europe, led by France. However, the rebels’ impressive list of backers should not mislead us into thinking that it gives them the advantage. Whereas Assad’s supporters are fewer, they form a more coherent and united block, compared with the rebels’ backers, who are split with regard to their vision of future Syria.

The United States, Turkey and Qatar wish that the Muslim Brotherhood control post-Assad Syria. That is the reason why the body meant to lead the opposition – the Syrian National Council (SNC) – operates out of Turkey and is completely under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. France, on the other hand, is not enthusiastic about the prospect of the Brotherhood and prefers to promote the secular Syrian leadership that has long since found refuge in Paris. The former head of the SNC, Sorbonne Professor Burhan Galioun, a left-leaning Arab nationalist, recently lost his patron, President Nicolas Sarkozy, and Turkey and the United States have since had an easier time isolating him and nominating a Kurdish exile, Abd al-Baset Seedah, in his stead.

Saudi Arabia, who, like France, dislikes the Muslim Brotherhood, would rather promote the Salafists, who are close to al-Qaeda. While the rush to promote the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is coming out of Turkey, the Saudis have been pushing the Salafists onto Syria from Lebanon. France has also tried to bolster its position in the region by giving shelter to Manaf Tlass, so far the most meaningful defector from Assad’s ranks.

Astonishingly, none of the powers vying for regime change in Syria actually envisage a dramatic improvement over the government of Bashar al-Assad. Muslim Brotherhood rule in Syria will most likely result in the creation of a state akin to Sudan, or, at best, Tunisia. A Salafist takeover would produce the horrifying prospects of a new Afghanistan in the heart of the Levant.

The suggestion from former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who proposed leaving the current Syrian regime in place and simply removing Assad himself from the equation, is troubling because such a plan would leave Iran’s deep infiltration into Syria intact. In light of these possibilities, it is not surprising that Russia is suggestingthat  the world stick to the devil it knows.

Yet what is even more troubling is the fact that actual viable candidates to lead Syria are ignored by rivaling powers. Candidates include the Kurds of the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria led by Sherkoh Abbas and a Sunni leader, Farid Ghadri, the head of the US-based Reform Party of Syria.

They share the vision of a decentralized government in Syria that would guarantee the safety of individual citizens and minorities in the framework of a federation that would also guarantee the coherence of government, while preserving autonomy for minorities and religious communities.

This plan was at the core of the dispute in the latest Cairo meeting of Syrian opposition groups. When Sherkoh and his colleagues observed that the prospects discussed were mere copies of yet another centralized government, either under the Muslim Brotherhood banner or the leadership of Arab nationalists like Manaf Tlass, they blew up the meeting.

The distorted vision of post-Assad Syria is best exemplified by the Western elevation of Tlass – the former commander of the despised Republican Guards whose sole duty has been to protect Assad and his regime. What is more, Tlass’ chances of being accepted into the ranks of the opposition are close to nil, not only due to his professional history, but also to his provenance. The name Manaf is known as a pagan, pre-Islamic designation, which immediately raises a red flag with the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is less important to see whether Manaf Tlass is accepted by the Syrian rebels. What is more puzzling, is the West’s rejection of parties that envision a better future for Syria in favor of the likes of Tlass and the Muslim Brotherhood, who are more than likely to perpetuate either a nationalist or an Islamist despotic regime in Syria.

Amos Yadlin im Feb.’13:
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=7282
(…) Turning to Syria, Yadlin said the ongoing crisis there presents a unique opportunity for Israel to break the radical axis in the Middle East. The former intelligence chief made the comments at a special event to unveil his think tank’s „2012-2013 Strategic Assessment.“

According to Yadlin, „The anti-Israel radical axis has been fractured and is heading toward breaking point; at the center of the axis lies Syria, which is gradually crumbling, with the Sunni-Arab world turning against it.“

„This is a positive development,“ Yadlin stated. (…)

Yadlin told reporters that the destabilization of the Damascus regime is not necessarily a bad omen for Israel. In fact, he said, the potential overthrow of the regime „was a great opportunity for Israel and could be very promising if it takes Syria out of the radical axis.“ (…)
(Die folgenden Abschnitte gehören zum nächsten Abschnitt der Befriedungsversuche, die Israel sabotierte:
The Russian and Iranian foreign ministers, and U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, portrayed Syrian National Coalition leader Moaz al-Khatib’s new willingness to talk with the Assad regime as a major step toward resolving the two-year-old war.

„If we want to stop the bloodshed we cannot continue putting the blame on one side or the other,“ Iran’s Ali Akbar Salehi said on Sunday, welcoming Khatib’s overtures and adding that he was ready to keep talking to the opposition. Iran is Assad’s main military backer together with Russia.

„This is a very important step. Especially because the coalition was created on the basis of categorical rejection of any talks with the regime,“ Lavrov was quoted as saying on Sunday by Russia’s Itar Tass news agency. (…)

Politicians from the United States, Europe and the Middle East at the Munich Security Conference praised Khatib’s „courage.“ But the moderate Islamist preacher was likely to face sharp criticism from the exiled leadership back in Cairo.

Khatib has put his leadership on the line by saying he would be willing to talk to representatives of the Assad regime on condition they release 150,000 prisoners and issue passports to the tens of thousands of displaced people who have fled to neighboring countries but do not have documents.

Walid al-Bunni, a member of the coalition’s 12-member politburo, described Khatib’s meeting with Iran’s foreign minister as a failure.

„It was unsuccessful. The Iranians are unprepared to do anything that could help the causes of the Syrian Revolution,“ Bunni, a former political prisoner, told Reuters from Budapest.

Bunni said the 70-member coalition is preparing to convene in full in Cairo, to be briefed by Khatib on his latest diplomatic moves and meetings in Munich.

Khatib, whose family are custodians of the Umayyad Mosque in the historic center of Damascus, is seen as a bulwark against Salafist forces who are a main player in the armed opposition.

He was chosen as the head of the coalition in Qatar last year, with crucial backing from the Muslim Brotherhood.

One of Khatib’s colleagues on the coalition politburo, speaking on condition of anonymity, pointed to comments by Salehi and Lavrov on Sunday, a day after their meetings with Khatib, as evidence that they still backed Assad.

Salehi told the Munich conference where the round of talks took place that the solution was to hold elections in Syria making no mention of Assad having to leave the country.

Zur Offensive Obamas, zusammen mit Russland eine „jemenitische Lösung“ zu erzwingen:
NYT 26. Mai

Wie Manaf Tlass gelinkt und aus dem Weg geschafft wurde, erkennt man immerhin schemenhaft in diesen beiden Dokumenten:
http://english.aawsat.com/2012/07/article55241214/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-general-manaf-tlass
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/07/generals-road-map.html

Danach übernahm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamad_bin_Khalifa_Al_Thani
Er ließ die Delegierten des SNC im November 2012 in Doha so lange von bewaffneten Bulldoggen in einem Konferenzraum einsperren, bis sie einwilligten, sich unter dem Vorsitz des Muslimbruders Moaz al-Khatib einer National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces der qatarischen Führung zu unterwerfen.

Iran – Syrien – Israel: Zu den Wandlungen in der iranischen Regionalpolitik

(TG in NeoPresse, Jan. 2013)

Es gibt eine Fülle von Anzeichen, daß im Iran eine regionalpolitische Umorientierung im Gang ist.

Letzte Woche gab es dazu sehr direkte Aussagen von Kayhan Barzegar, dem Direktor des Instituts für Strategische Studien des Nahen Osten (IMESS) in Teheran und Vorsitzenden der Abteilung für Politikwissenschaft und Internationale Beziehungen am Wissenschafts- und Forschungs-Zweig der Islamischen Azad-Universität. Seinen Titel „Verschiebung in der Natur der iranischen Regionalpolitik“ veröffentlichte Die Evidenz (Toter Link) auf deutsch.

In diese Reihe gehören jüngste Äußerungen (Toter Link) von Ali Akbar Velayati, einem Berater von Ayatollah Khamenei, der auch als Präsidentschaftskandidat gehandelt wird. Er bekräftigte, was dem Iran ohnehin unterstellt ist:

Der Schwerpunkt unserer Syrienpolitik ist es, einem Zerfall des Widerstandes gegen Israel vorzubeugen. Stürzt Präsident Bashar al-Assad, wird die Front des Widerstandes gegen Israel aufgebrochen.

Der Gehalt dieser überflüssigen Mitteilung liegt in einer merk-würdigen Entgegensetzung. Die iranische Unterstützung für Assad bedeute nicht, zitiert ABNA Barzegar weiter, daß Teheran seinem regionalpolitischen Ziel das „Recht der syrischen Nation“ unterordne, „seine Gesetzgeber selbst zu wählen„.

Wir glauben, daß in Syrien Reformen nötig sind, die den Forderungen der syrischen Nation Rechnung tragen, ohne daß zu diesem Zweck auf Gewaltmaßnahmen und Unterstützung durch die USA zurück gegriffen wird.

Soweit fast alles, wie gehabt, wenn wir von der Kombination der Themen „Widerstand gegen Israel“ und „syrischer Selbstbestimmung“ absehen.

Die Nachricht, die ABNA daraus macht, besteht in einer identischen Wortwahl des Aufrufes von Kayhan Barzegar und des syrischen Außenministers Walid al-Muallem, der die „nationalistische“ (patriotische) Opposition aufgefordert hatte, die Waffen niederzulegen und Gespräche mit dem Ziel aufzunehmen, „eine neue Regierung zu bilden„.
Nehmen wir hinzu, daß die zionistische Führungsclique, die seit dem erfolglosen Libanonfeldzug 2006 alle Hebel in Bewegung gesetzt hat, die USA zu einem vernichtenden Angriff auf den Iran zu bewegen, jüngst damit begonnen hat, eine „Mauer“ nach dem Muster der libanesisch-israelischen Grenze auf dem völkerrechtswidrig annektierten Golan zu errichten, wird einigermaßen deutlich, an wen diese Botschaften gerichtet sind: An die israelischen Opponenten gegen diesen buchstäblich wahnsinnigen Zirkel innerhalb der herrschenden zionistischen Militäroligarchie.

Wie wahnsinnig er ist, enthüllte letzten November der ehemalige israelische Generalstabschef Gabi Ashkenazi. Er berichtete, Netanyahu und Ehud Barak hätten ihm 2010 die offene Mobilmachung zu einem Angriff der israelischen Luftwaffe auf iranische Atomanlagen befohlen, offenbar mit der Absicht, iranische Präventivmaßnahmen zu provozieren, die den fehlenden Vorwand zu dem Angriff geliefert hätten.
Ashkenazi verweigerte mit Rückendeckung des seinerzeitigen Mossad-Chef Meir Dagan, dem Direktor des Shin Bet Yuval Diskin und dem Staatspräsidenten Shimon Peres den Befehl (Haaretz). Der Bau der Golan-Befestigung ist gegen die Provokationen gegenüber dem Iran ein Fliegenschiß, aber er folgt demselben Muster. Wie immer der Krieg gegen Syrien beendet wird, und sei es auch – was so gut wie ausgeschlossen ist – mit einem sogenannten „Sieg“ der Führungsriege um Assad – abgesehen davon, daß Assad bis zur Operation Cast Lead geheime Friedensgespräche mit dem damaligen israelischen Premier Olmert unter türkischer Vermittlung führte! – die Syrer haben hernach anderes im Kopf und zu tun, als irgendwelche revisionistischen und revanchistischen Politiken gegen Israel zu verfolgen.

Die Diplomatie von Kayhan Barzegar besteht demnach darin, gutwilligen Zuhörern in der zionistischen Elite mitzuteilen:

Wenn ihr euch dem Erhalt der territoialen Integrität Syriens nicht (länger) in den Weg stellt, dann bescheiden wir uns mit diesem Minimalziel.

Mehr kann ein Mann wie Kayhan Barzegar schwerlich tun, das hergebrachte Muster der „strategischen Allianz“ des Iran mit Syrien zur Disposition zu stellen.
Einen indirekten Hinweis auf die Haltbarkeit dieser Deutung lieferte bereits am 2.Jan. die israelische Desinformations-Crew von Debka.file. Sie sah sich veranlaßt (Toter Link), horrible Szenarien über einen demnächst blutig ausartenden Machtkampf zwischen einem plötzlich zum Reformer und Kämpfer gegen Korruption beförderten Ahmadinejad und der „Führungsclique“ um Ayatollah Ali Khamenei auszumalen – natürlich mit der „Vorhersage“, er werde „unvermeidlich“ mit einem Sieg des radikalsten, militantesten, kurz bösartigsten Flügels der iranischen Eliten enden.
Offenbar sehen gewisse Leute ihre liebsten Feinde abhanden kommen.